The Evolution of Campaign Finance and its Reform: An Expoloration and Economic Analysis by Milloy, Meghan
1 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND ITS REFORM:  AN 
EXPOLORATION AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
by 
Meghan Ayn Milloy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the faculty of The University of Mississippi in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements of the Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oxford 
May 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Approved by: 
 
________________________________ 
                                                                                       Advisor:  Dr. William Shughart II 
 
________________________________ 
                                                                            Reader:  Dr. Richard Forgette 
 
________________________________ 
 Reader:  Dr. John Winkle
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2009 
Meghan Ayn Milloy 
iii 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
ABSTRACT 
MEGHAN AYN MILLOY:  The Evolution of Campaign Finance and Its Reform:  An 
Exploration and Economic Analysis 
(Under the Direction of Dr. William Shughart II) 
 
 
 From the blunders of Theodore Roosevelt that initiated much of the debate on 
campaign finance reform to Bill Bradley’s ideas on voting reform as a means to reform 
campaign finance, this is a topic that has inspired much debate and controversy.  My 
hope is that throughout the following pages, through the history, opinions, and 
empirical evidence, the reader may formulate his or her own opinions on the good, evil, 
and necessity – or lack thereof – of reforming the system.  History teaches where we 
have gone wrong.  Econometric evidence tells us where we should go next.  And 
opinions for future reform lead us in the right direction.  Such reform seemingly has no 
end in sight as there will always be new restrictions necessary and new ways to evade 
them.  While much of the statistical evidence was drawn from the last decade, its impact 
remains salient as the numbers may have increased but the ratios remain the same.   
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1 
Introduction 
 
It’s all about supply and demand.  
 
 I wonder how many times that’s been said throughout the course of an 
economics major’s collegiate career.  If the truth be told though, it is all about supply 
and demand.  Nearly every facet of life – from sporting events to politics – can be 
described, analyzed, and predicted with little more than a Cartesian plane and a few 
ideas about the rational consumer and, of course, supply and demand.  The tricky part 
comes when describing entities or situations that don’t exactly give us cut-and-dried 
ingredients for our recipes of economic analysis.  Occasionally one’s mind must bend to 
envision our great statesmen as figures lining up vertically on their inelastic supply 
schedule.  Oftentimes, our ideals of money being supplied must be reversed to satisfy 
the demand for money – as is in the case of campaign finance.  Still other times we 
must alter how we consider rent, from the giving of funds for temporary ownership of 
an item to a price paid above that necessary to attract the given supply.  In the case of 
politicians and their inelastic supply schedule, any price paid above zero exceeds the 
minimum necessary to attract such supply; so any price paid in the process of earning 
such a position in our Nation’s Capitol must be considered a rent.  And thus it may be 
shown that while working for the greater good of the good ole U.S. of A., our leaders 
are operating mostly, if not wholly, on rent-seeking behavior.   
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I.  A History of Campaign Finance Reform 
 
 The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), or McCain-Feingold as 
it is typically known outside the Beltway, is the most recent in a long string of attempts 
at regulating contributions and spending in elections.  While most people believe that 
the history of campaign finance reform began around the Watergate scandal, the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA) and the ensuing Supreme Court case, Buckley v. 
Valeo, such reform actually has a long history dating back to the 1800s.  As with any 
initiative to reform, this one began with the realization of a problem – or in this case, 
the realization that a man was seemingly untrue to his words.   
 When Theodore Roosevelt took office following the assassination of President 
McKinley in 1901, he began a promised streak of trust busting.  However, when it was 
time for re-election in 1904, Roosevelt turned to the very same bankers and trusts he 
had busted in search of funding for what would be his landslide victory.  Upon re-
election, Roosevelt realized that he had acted in somewhat of a contradictory manner – 
busting trusts then turning to the executives of the same enterprises for his campaign 
finances.  Not long after, in his speech to Congress in early 1905, Roosevelt proposed 
that contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose 
be deemed illegal.  However, he gave no suggestion for restrictions on contributions 
from the individuals in charge of such corporations, or on any individuals at all for that 
matter.  This prompted the formation of the National Publicity Law Organization 
(NPLO), an interest group of citizens dedicated to the regulation of campaign finance, 
expressly favoring public disclosure of the sources of such funds.  In the same speech, 
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when Roosevelt called for political parties to publicly fund their candidates in federal 
elections, he began the initiative for campaign finance disclosure, though it took years 
for Congress to act (Birnbaum, xi-21).   
 In 1907, a senator by the name of Benjamin Tillman introduced a bill known as 
the Tillman Act that prohibited contributions from national corporations and banks to 
political campaigns.  Such prohibition came in light of many large contributions by 
corporations to Roosevelt in return for what seemed like political influence and at times 
even appointed political positions.  While the restrictions of the Tillman Act of 1907 
remain in effect today, its authors failed to have foreseen future issues with so-called 
soft money contributions – typically donations made in attempts to avoid federal 
regulations or limits, usually by way of national party or organizations – by 
corporations to the national political parties.  This act satisfied reformists for a while, 
but in late 1907, members of the Democratic Party, especially those associated with 
Tammany Hall, and even the Republican President Roosevelt began calling for public 
financing of political parties and campaigns.  While it might have seemed like a good 
idea and one step closer to political equality, almost none of our statesmen at the time 
were willing to adopt it, or to even discuss the idea for that matter (Sorauf, 1-28). 
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A.  The Federal Corrupt Practices Act  
 
 With a Republican majority in Congress and the initiative of the NPLO, the 
Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was passed in 1910 with vague requirements and 
one-sided limitations, only specifying party expenditures for House campaigns.  These 
expenditures were limited to $5000, and the vague requirements compelled single-state 
political parties and election committees to disclose their spendings ex-post.  Thus 
loopholes were aplenty and penalties for failure to comply rarely were enforced.  
However, in 1911 the FCPA was amended to include restrictions on party spending in 
Senate campaigns to $10,000 and required disclosure of spending not only by the 
political parties but also by the candidates.   
 As could be expected, such limitations and divulgences sparked controversy 
among candidates, and in 1918 Truman H. Newberry, the Republican who defeated 
Henry Ford in the Michigan primary, was charged with over-spending – by about 
$170,000 – in his election bid.  Newberry disputed the accusation saying not only that 
Congress had no authority to regulate the primaries but also that he had not violated the 
law, which merely applied to political parties and campaign committees and most 
certainly not to the candidate or individual supporters.  As a result, the Supreme Court 
ruled in Newberry v. United States (1921) that indeed Congress had no authority to 
restrict party primaries or nominations and, thus, that spending limits, as defined in 
FCPA, should be struck down.   
 This ruling was one of many events that underscored the deficiencies and 
ambiguities of congressional attempts to regulate campaign finance.  Shortly after the 
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Court’s ruling in Newberry, a couple of oil moguls “lent” large sums of money to the 
Secretary of the Interior, Albert Fall.  Coincidentally, President Taft had recently 
transferred oversight of a large oil reserve at Teapot Dome, Wyoming, from the 
Department of the Navy to the Department of the Interior, and Secretary Fall just 
happened to lease Teapot Dome, without competitive bidding, to the same moguls.  
Once again brought to light was corruption and influence of large corporations’ 
contributions to the political realm.  In response Congress passed the Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1925, which remained the authority on campaign finance until the 
1970s. 
 The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 effectively paralleled the regulations 
set forth in the FCPA of 1921 except for minor changes, such as the deletion of 
regulations of primaries.  It amended the rules of disclosure in the attempt to prevent 
financing such as that which had led to the Teapot Dome scandal; prevention came in 
the form of requiring all political committees, House and Senate candidates to file 
quarterly reports of any contribution greater than $100.  It also modified the spending 
limits to allow Senate campaigns $25,000 and House campaigns $5,000 – unless a state 
specified lower limits.   
 Despite such supposed improvements, no agency or department was ever 
established to monitor compliance.  Similarly, the law failed to specify who would be 
able to access the reports, how the reports would be accessed, and even failed to specify 
any penalties that might be imposed if political parties and candidates failed to report 
their spendings and contributions.  Thus, many parties and candidates alike simply 
never reported their monetary activity, and in turn went unpunished – nearly unnoticed.  
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The spending limits laid out in FCPA were equally as failed and equally as disregarded, 
as those of its predecessor.  Since the law required party committees only to disclose 
expenditures, the rules were easily evaded by creating multiple committees per election 
or candidate.  In such an instance each party could meet the spending limits and 
exponentially increase the funds available to the candidate.   
 In 1940, along with preventing government employees from engaging in 
political activity, the Hatch Act, sponsored by Carl Hatch of New Mexico, restricted the 
amount of money given to political campaigns.*
1
  This time individuals were allowed to 
give only $5,000 each year to candidates or national parties or committees, and those 
national parties or committees could receive or spend only $3 million in total.  Similar 
to the problems of previous reform attempts, the Hatch Act was circumvented by 
donations of individuals to multiple national party committees or by making large 
donations to state and local committees, as they were not covered by this act.   
 With the rise of labor unions came new questions and hurdles to overcome in 
reforming campaign finance.  The early 1940s saw the growth of unions into political 
machines, and unions were using their treasury funds to source much of the Democratic 
Party’s campaign warchest.  Republicans and many Southern Democrats, in the attempt 
to suppress labor’s influence in politics, passed the Smith-Connally Act in 1943, which 
simply prohibited labor unions from using their funds for federal political campaign 
purposes.  An oddity of sorts, this law was passed despite President Roosevelt’s veto 
but was adopted as a war measure and thus expired six months after the war’s end.  In 
1946, after a successful election year for Republicans in Congress, Smith-Connally was 
                                                 
* The Hatch Act was inspired in part by revelations of corruption in the New Deal’s Works Progress Administration (Couch and 
Shughart 1998). 
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made permanent in the form of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and has remained on the 
books ever since.   
 Years passed with no action taken on reforming campaign finance.  In fact, the 
only real mention of such came when President John F. Kennedy decided to form his 
Commission on Campaign Costs to investigate problems and develop proposals to be 
submitted to Congress.  After the release of the Commission’s report, though seemingly 
unrelated, the chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Russell Long, introduced and 
successfully passed the first major reform bill since FCPA in 1925.  In his bill, he hoped 
to further the principle of “one man, one vote” by reducing the influence that the 
wealthy had over political campaigns.  He would do so by creating a Presidential 
Election Campaign Fund that would be financed by taxpayers’ $1 checkoffs on their 
federal tax returns; these monies would serve as a public subsidy to political parties to 
aid in financing presidential campaigns.  The idea was widely criticized in Congress and 
found few supporters, but with Long’s powerful position on the Finance Committee, he 
was able to get his way by tacking his measure on as a rider to the Foreign Investors 
Tax Act.  Long and other supporters of such regulation of campaigns were temporarily 
victorious, but in 1967 Senators Albert Gore – father of present-day Al Gore – and John 
Williams sponsored an amendment to repeal Long’s Act, arguing that it would do little 
to put a damper on campaign funding as it only added monies to private funds already 
in the system. 
 Even if the Long Act had been passed, campaign spending was spiraling out of 
control and was doubling and tripling in the new few elections – mostly due to the rise 
of media influence.  In the 1956 elections, total campaign spending was nearing $160 
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million, with over $9 million of that being used for radio and television advertising.  By 
1968, spending had doubled to $300 million, with spending on radio and television 
increasing nearly six times to almost $59 million.  This jump in numbers was of concern 
to many Democrats as the past few elections had proved to be less than fiscally fruitful - 
Republicans were far out-raising Democrats and thus better able to conduct the types of 
media campaigns necessary to win (Corrado, 27-32). 
 
B.  The Federal Election Campaign Act 
 
 With fears for their political lives looming, Congress passed the far from perfect 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).  This law was distinct from previous 
attempts at campaign finance reform as it placed specific limits on how much 
candidates could spend on media advertising, not only in general elections, but also in 
the primaries.  This curbed campaign spending on media, but in the 1972 election, 
overall spending had once again risen to $425 million – most notable was President 
Nixon’s reelection campaign in which he spent nearly twice as much as he had in his 
first election of 1968, and his opponent George McGovern’s campaign spent almost 
four times as much as did Nixon’s in 1968; such patterns led to the conclusion that 
further reform was necessary. 
 However, before Congress was able to pick apart FECA and test out its success, 
the Watergate scandal erupted.  With detailed findings of large contributions, illegal 
corporate gifts, and quid pro quo funds, investigators questioned how much money 
influenced politics in the form of purchased ambassadorships and other favors.  Such 
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scandal forced Congress once again to examine the issue of campaign finance reform in 
order to curtail corruption. 
 In 1974, Congress passed the FECA Amendments and in doing so enacted the 
20
th
 Century’s most comprehensive piece of campaign finance legislation.  While the 
new act technically was only a set of amendments, it left little of the original FECA of 
1971 intact.  The disclosure requirements of that prior law were strengthened 
significantly with penalties put in place and the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
created and given supreme oversight of all political finance activities.  This FECA also 
established very specific contribution limits that are as follows:  Individuals may give 
$2,300 to each candidate or candidate committee per election cycle,  $28,500 to any 
national party per calendar year, $5,000 to any other political committee per calendar 
year, and a total of $108,500 per calendar year.  Multi-candidate committees may give 
$5,000 to each candidate or candidate committee per election cycle, $15,000 to any 
national party per calendar year, $5,000 to any other political committee per calendar 
year, and an unlimited total per calendar year.  Lastly, other political committees may 
give $2,300 to each candidate or candidate committee per election cycle, $20,000 to any 
national party per calendar year, $5,000 to any other political committee per calendar 
year, and an unlimited total per calendar year.  The FECA amendments also prohibit 
cash contributions in excess of $100 and any contribution in someone else’s name.   
 Another component of FECA 1974, and similar to Long’s attempt at an 
innovative cure for campaign finance abuse, created a voluntary, publicly financed 
presidential campaign fund that candidates could receive if they agreed not to raise any 
more money after the primary season ended.  The subsidy typically was an amount 
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equal to the aggregate spending limit on their campaign.  Funding of this subsidy would 
come from a federal tax check off on federal tax forms – just as Long had suggested 
(Corrado, 34-35).   
 
C.  Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 
 
 As is the case with most provisions dealing with money, this legal dispute was 
not without controversy.  In 1975, Senator James Buckley of New York and others 
brought suit against Francis Valeo, Secretary of the Senate, stating that FECA violated 
their First and Fifth Amendment rights.  In a landmark per curiam decision, the Court 
ruled that while First Amendment rights were indeed burdened by the contribution 
restrictions, compelling government interest in preventing corruption outweighed the 
mild inconvenience to one’s constitutional rights.   The decision upheld contribution 
limits as long as they were at least high enough to fund a competitive campaign 
properly, but found limits on campaign expenditures to be unconstitutional and an 
infringement on a candidate’s free speech.  The decision also limited the reach of the 
law to deal only with speech by the candidate or political party or committee; the law 
could thus not limit citizen groups’ or individuals’ opinionated discourse in favor of or 
against any given candidate (Corrado, 41).   
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D.  The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA/Mc-Cain Feingold) 
 
 This brings us to the most recent challenges for campaign finance reformists – 
soft money contributions – and the most modern attempts to mend the cracks in the 
system – the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).  The necessity for BCRA 
became apparent after Bill Clinton’s second come-from-behind victory in 1996.  Along 
with mistakes by the Dole campaign, Clinton’s camp realized that they could skirt 
existing law by using “soft” money contributed to national political parties to fund so-
called issue ads.  These ads, as opposed to those expressing outright support for one 
candidate or another, simply featured Clinton and presented his issues – and were free 
from such contribution and spending limits as long as no direct language was used that 
urged voters to vote one way or another.  This innovation of soft money contributors 
and issue ads caught on quickly and became a major campaign talking point by the end 
of the election.  The controversies over White House visits and overnight stays for 
donors of large sums also surfaced during the 1996 election cycle.  After Clinton’s 
reelection, soft monies raised by the six national committees – Republican National 
Committee (RNC), National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), National 
Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), Democratic National Committee 
(DNC), Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), and Democratic 
Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) - totaled over $260 million, a number that 
was more than triple the amount raised in the previous presidential election year. 
 Such large sums of soft money and skirting of existing laws not only changed 
the course for reformers but also nearly negated previous campaign finance regulations 
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and Court rulings.  Among other effects, soft monies and issue ads basically had 
obliterated spending limits for presidential campaigns; stripped contribution limits of 
any value as candidates could draw from unlimited soft money; eased the bans on 
giving by corporations and banks; and evaded disclosure requirements as long as the 
donors argued that their contribution would merely pay for an issue ad and not be used 
to express outright support or solicit votes for a particular candidate.   
 When Senators John McCain and Russ Feingold sponsored BCRA, they sought 
to reform previous reforms, and they did so barely – it passed by a vote of 60 to 40 – on 
March 20, 2002.  While this law was the most complex to date, it was still flawed, and 
President George W. Bush noted that sentiment in his signing speech on March 27, 
2002, when he said that though it was far from perfect, he believed that it would 
improve the current system of campaign financing, and thus he would sign it into law.  
BCRA is indeed complex and is perhaps best explained by the Campaign Finance 
Institute in their categorized definition of each provision of the Act. (See Appendix 1.) 
 As could be expected, BCRA was soon followed by a series of appeals, most of 
which had no serious effect on the essence of the law, but did allow for a more detailed 
interpretation of its language. Just eighteen months after President Bush signed the 
reform into law, arguments from then Senate Whip, Mitch McConnell, the National 
Rifle Association, and the Democratic Party of California, were heard by the Supreme 
Court in the case of McConnell vs. Federal Election Commission (2002).  Plaintiffs 
claimed that BCRA’s restrictions on spending and contributions hindered their First 
Amendment rights, most specifically freedom of speech, and challenged the Court to 
declare certain sections of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act unconstitutional.  
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However, in a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that money was property not speech and, 
similar to Buckley v. Valeo (1976), that the restrictions were justified because of the 
government’s legitimate interest in preventing corruption.  Specifically, Justices 
Stevens and O’Connor held to the hydraulic theory of campaign finance law that, like 
water, money will always find an outlet and that the government was justified in at least 
preventing schemes to evade the constraints set forth in BCRA.   
 More recently, in 2007, the Supreme Court ruled in Federal Election 
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., that restrictions on issue ads in the 
months preceding an election set forth in BCRA are unconstitutional.  In this 5-4 
decision, the majority stated that “enough was enough” and that such limitations on 
speech and opinion should be outlawed.  Rumors surrounding the Court at the time say 
that three of the five justices in the majority – Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas – wanted to 
go even further and reverse the McConnell decision altogether (Malbin, 3-12). 
 
II.  The Economics of Campaign Finance and Its Reform 
 
 With such a long, complex, and debatable history, one can expect the economics 
of such campaign finance to follow the same path.  If the realm of politics were a 
perfectly competitive one, with market-clearing prices and zero profits, any sort of 
explanation of politicians’ economic behavior – rational or not – might be described in a 
few short sentences.  Perhaps such perfectly competitive statesmen would be summed 
up as non-profit vehicles for carrying out constituents’ best interests.  This is not the 
case, however, and politics aside, all candidates for public office engage in rent-seeking 
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behavior that explains much of campaign finance regulation’s history.  The following 
discussion will bring to light some economic ideas about campaign finance, and shed 
light on much of its behavior and reform.  While I am citing a reasonably representative 
selection of such literature, many ideas exist, including many conflicting studies and 
analyses.  Please note that the following studies are only a selection of reports on the 
subject and is limited to a group that does not contradict one another.   
 
A. Rent-seeking Candidates 
 
 Richard Fenno (1978) a renowned political scientist and Woodrow Wilson 
Award winner for his book, Home Style, described three goals for members of 
Congress:  reelection, power in Congress, and good public policy.  While the optimist 
would like to think that the third is the most prominent goal influencing these members’ 
behavior, Fenno argues that all other actions and goals considered, reelection is the 
main driving force behind politicians’ behavior.  Thus, though there may be a multitude 
of factors influencing incumbents to raise campaign contributions, the greatest of these 
is aimed toward securing their reelection.  Closely related is candidates’ rent-seeking or 
profit-seeking behavior.  Since successful campaigns and their respective party 
committees are allowed to keep excess campaign monies after the election for later 
election cycles, the most efficient campaign spenders receive a personal, tangible 
benefit from running a campaign.   
 When statesmen (from hereon referred to as senators for purposes of 
simplification) choose to devote their time to raising campaign funds instead of 
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pursuing other activities, we assume that as rational actors the benefits of the funds they 
receive are greater than their opportunity costs of raising such funds.  They are able to 
exceed these opportunity costs by distributing public goods in the form of selective 
benefits that the contributors compete to obtain.   Such benefits can range in form from 
a seat at the senator’s table at a Washington DC dinner party to money in a bill to fix a 
bridge in a constituent’s hometown.  By supplying such reward for contributions, the 
process of campaign fundraising creates a system of supply and demand not unlike any 
other competitive market.  Thus, the more the senator seemingly has to offer, the higher 
the demand for his services, and the more people are willing to contribute             
(Regens, 1-9).   
 Also similar to a market for consumable goods is the efficiency in spending of 
the senators’ earnings.  Even with current technology and more media coverage than 
ever, perfect information in an election is impossible, and senators are likely to spend 
much more than necessary.  Since campaign costs have more than tripled in the past 
decade, candidates are combating such costs by raising significant amounts of money in 
the first years of their term, well in advance of the next Election Day.  The Senate has 
always been considered the more prestigious legislative chamber, with longer terms and 
fewer members, so its members are also expected to be more distant from political 
change and constant influences of their reelection chances.  Ideally, senators are 
expected to devote their time to policy and to the public good rather than to 
campaigning and fundraising.  Fenno described this ideal as a cyclical pattern of 
senatorial fundraising with moderate amounts of money coming in shortly after the 
election, a trough of low funding throughout the middle, and a peak toward the end – 
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just before reelection day.  However, in reality senators are raising money in increasing 
amounts as their term unfolds.  In a study done between 1979 and 1990, sitting 
senators’ average contribution receipts were measured by party, source and year (See 
Table 1).  Of those, 38 followed Fenno’s ideal cycle, 15 of whom were Democrats, and 
the others increased their fundraising amounts every year. 
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Table 1:  Average receipts by U.S. Senators, by party and source, 1979-90, in thousands 
of dollars 
                                                                                                                Cycle in term of office 
 Early Middle Reelection 
Cohort/Party (Years 1-2) Years (3-4) Years (5-6) 
Total receipts    
1979-84 Republicans 232.5 178.3 3,890.0 
1979-84 Democrats 78.8 270.9 2,331.9 
1981-86 Republicans 234.5 594.4 4,240.4 
1981-86 Democrats 146.8 222.0 3,484.5 
1983-88 Republicans 356.9 613.5 4,401.9 
1983-88 Democrats 237.0 480.5 3,914.0 
1985-90 Republicans 458.2 588.5 3,652.4 
1985-90 Democrats 351.6 453.9 3,862.9 
Individual receipts    
1979-84 Republicans 137.7 124.5 2,796.2 
1979-84 Democrats 43.7 163.1 1,452.6 
1981-86 Republicans 113.4 439.0 2,887.8 
1981-86 Democrats 64.1 125.9 2,318.5 
1983-88 Republicans 238.1 429.6 2,947.9 
1983-88 Democrats 88.6 307.2 2,541.6 
1985-90 Republicans 206.1 475.9 2,567.3 
1985-90 Democrats 243.6 314.6 2,642.7 
PAC recieipts    
1979-84 Republicans 50.6 30.8 847.9 
1979-84 Democrats 17.7 47.4 677.4 
1981-86 Republicans 48.9 104.4 1,085.0 
1981-86 Democrats 36.0 67.7 902.1 
1983-88 Republicans 72.7 131.3 1,258.2 
1983-88 Democrats 63.2 132.6 1,151.5 
1985-90 Republicans 40.1 56.9 828.2 
1985-90 Democrats 38.0 78.6 992.4 
Source:  Regens and Gaddie (1995, p. 45) 
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 While it is easy to see the discrepancy between Fenno’s model of fundraising 
and fundraising that occurs in actual practice, it is quite a bit more difficult to discover 
why candidates would participate in such activity and what exactly drives them to such 
behavior.  The prevailing idea that explains these fundraising tactics is the idea of 
electoral insecurity.  The more vulnerable the candidates are to losing their race, the 
more money their supporters are willing to contribute.  Similarly, PACs view these 
vulnerable senators as investments able to produce a high return.  That is, senators 
desperate for funding are more likely to act on behalf of their funders – the PACs.  
Another idea by Fenno, is that early fundraising occurs as an act of replenishment.  The 
senator’s war chests are depleted by the recent election, and they are renewing their 
capital for the coming years (Magleby 48-55).   
 Two formulas are helpful in describing efficient fundraising by senators; these 
also allow us empirically to test the actual efficiency of the senator’s profit taking.  In 
order to do so, we define rents as finances contributed by third parties rather than loans 
taken from the senators’ own private wealth.  These finances may be divided into three 
external sources of funds:  individuals, PACs, and party committees.  Gross rents, then 
may be specified as 
 R = Ci + Cpac + Cp, 
where R is total revenue, Ci is contributions by individuals, Cpac is contributions by 
PACs, and Cp is contributions by party committees.  However the mere fact that R is a 
number greater than zero does not mean that the senator is an efficient rent-seeker.  
Efficiency requires that they conserve a portion of their receipts and also retain their 
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seat, and if not, much of the fundraising is inefficient.  In order to classify their rents as 
efficient or inefficient, net rents may be specified as 
 R’ = R – ( Dt + Ers ), 
where R’ is net revenue, Dt is debts at the end of the campaign, and Ers is expenditures 
after the election to hold onto the seat.   
 When R’ is a number greater than zero, candidates have run an efficient 
campaign and are deemed efficient profit takers even though the actual amount of R’ 
may be very small.  For those senators whose R’ is less than zero, a debt has been 
incurred and most likely, rent-seeking behavior will continue throughout their term in 
office (Regens, 45). 
 Based on the formulas above and data obtained from the Federal Election 
Commission, we are able to see exactly how many senators are efficient and how 
efficiency differs between parties.  During the 1984 through 1990 election cycles, 111 
incumbents were up for election.  As shown in Table 2, out of these 111, 45 were 
successful in protecting at least part of their war chest, thus deeming them efficient.  
The largest rent retained was by then Senate Majority Leader, Bob Dole, in 1986 with 
an R’ of $998,945.10.  Though Dole was a Republican, 11 of the top 15 efficient profit-
makers were Democrats. 
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 Table 2:  Frequency of efficient profit taking by incumbent Senators, 1984-90 
                                                               Cycle 
 1983-84 1985-86 1987-88 1989-90 Total 
All Senators      
Inefficient 15 16 20 15 66 (59.5%) 
Efficient 14 11 5 15 45 (40.5%) 
N 29 27 25 30 111 
Democrats      
Inefficient 6 4 10 9 29  (56.9%) 
Efficient 6 5 4 7 22 (43.1%) 
N 12 9 14 16 51 
Republicans      
Inefficient 9 12 10 6 37 (61.7%) 
Efficient 8 6 1 8 23 (38.3%) 
N 17 18 11 14 60 
Source:  Regens and Gaddie (1995, p. 47) 
 
 The incumbents who are less in need of quick boosts of cash are more likely to 
retain more of their war chests after Election Day.  Thus, the incumbents who rely more 
on individual contributions as opposed to contributions by PACs are retaining more 
cash.  This creates a market for incumbents to extract utility from financial support in 
return for utility given to contributors via policy action.  However, senators’ efforts 
must be balanced between time spent in Washington developing their policy positions 
and time spent at home engaging in rent-seeking, and ultimately reelection activities.  
Senators’ ability to allocate their time budgets effectively and conduct their campaigns 
within funding constraints is limited, therefore limiting the number of incumbents who 
can efficiently gain positive benefits from their rent-seeking efforts.  Since the policy 
market is limited, the dependence of senators on this market to give benefits to their 
contributors shows us that the pursuit of election or reelection generally is inefficient. 
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 B.  Selective Contributions by PACs 
 
 In the contribution market, candidates create the demand for funds, and donors – 
PACs, individuals, and party committees – create the supply.  On the other hand, in the 
policy market, candidates create the supply of policy results and the donors are the 
demanders of such results.  In this market, organized interests, presumably PACs, will 
seek the candidates that will deliver their policy initiatives effectively at the lowest cost.  
In order to do so, PACs must support those candidates who not only agree with their 
policy stances, but also have the seniority and committee assignments that effect them.  
For the legislator, the more negatively such policy provision will affect their reelection 
chances, the higher the cost to the donors will be for the policy results.  In a situation in 
which the negative effects are high along with the costs, the rents obtained by the 
senator will be relatively low.  For PACs, campaign contributions may be directed by 
three senatorial characteristics:  ideology, vulnerability, and committee position; and 
committee position may be further divided into corporate, labor, trade, and cooperative 
PACs. 
 Ideologically, conservatives tend to receive much more funding from corporate 
and trade PACs, whereas more liberal leaning senators receive more contributions from 
labor PACs.  Cooperative PACs, those usually referred to as agricultural but that relate 
to all aspects of farming and domestic consumable goods, usually balance their 
donations between the two.   Roll call votes are usually the main source of information 
for such PACs.  They are the action of the senator and can weigh their ideology, and 
thus their effectiveness for the PAC, much better than mere campaign rhetoric.   
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 A characteristic that is equally as defining as ideology is a senator’s tenure or 
seniority.  While at times PACs may view freshman senators as attractive investments 
due to their willingness to abide by the money’s rules, contribution statistics show that 
senators are much more likely to receive higher funding if they have seniority in the 
chamber, and thus a more influential voice in debate.  Similarly, the more vulnerable an 
incumbent is to losing his reelection bid, the more PACs are likely to contribute.  Since 
the incumbent fears losing his seat, he will feel the need to increase his monies in order 
to add a bit of a safety blanket to the campaign and potentially scare off opponents.  
These incumbents, in a rush to decrease their challengers’ chances, are much more 
likely to provide policy benefits to their donors at a lower cost than normal as the need 
for funding trumps all other priorities.  Thus interest groups are able to target these 
incumbents who are in the most vulnerable positions not only to receive funding but 
also to deliver high policy returns.   
 Lastly, an important determinant of PAC contributions is a senator’s placement 
in committee.  With sufficient information, PACs are able to target their support to 
members of committees who directly affect their interests.  To test this statistic, Regens 
and Gaddie developed a regression analysis of PAC contributions to various committee 
members in 1990.  The equation, which will show variations in donations to corporate, 
trade, labor, and cooperative PACs may be defined as 
 Yi = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 
+ b10X10 + b11X11 + b12X12 + e, 
where Yi = dollars to the incumbent from some PAC, X1 = incumbent ideology, 
measured by the National Journal Composite Score, X2 = incumbent seniority, X3 = 
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incumbent marginality, X4 = challenger experience, X5 = party (1 for Democrat, 0 for 
Republican), X6 = temporal counter, X7 = Labor Committee, X8 = Banking 
Committee, X9 = Energy and Natural Resources Committee, X10 = Agriculture 
Committee, X11 = Small Business Committee, X12 = Commerce, Science, and 
Technology Committee, and e = error term.  
 These variables may be defined as follows:  Yi is the total of all financial 
campaign contributions to the incumbent from any PAC; X1 is a rating of the 
incumbent’s ideology as scored by the National Journal, which, after tallying 
congressional voting behavior in a variety of interest areas, assigns higher numbers to 
liberals and lower numbers to conservatives; X2 is the number of years in office and 
describes the seniority of the incumbent; X3, incumbent marginality, is defined by 
Regens and Gaddie as “50 percent minus the candidate’s total percentage of the two 
party vote”; X4 scores the challenger’s experience as their number of years in any 
elected office; X5 is a binomial that assigns either 1 or 0 to the  incumbent depending 
on their party; to control for factors other than incumbent attributes or inflation issues, 
X6 is used; X7 through X12 give incumbents a 1 if they are on any of the said 
committees and 0 if not; and e, the error term, controls for any other factors not 
specified in the model (Regens, 62-59).  
 After running a regression analysis based on information obtained from the 
Federal Election Commission, Regens and Gaddie ended up with the results reported in 
Table 3. 
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Table 3:  Summary of statistics of PAC contributions from 1982-1988, in 1990 
dollars 
                                                                                   PAC CONTRIBUTIONS 
 Corporate Labor Trade Cooperative 
Mean Contribution 429,659 112,526 224,197 15,525 
Sd 279,869 116,532 105,742 16,349 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 1,555,507 380,177 572,787 66,921 
Total Contributions 48,121,871 12,602,959 25,110,148 1,738,847 
Percentage of all PAC 
Contributions 
54.95 14.39 28.67 1.99 
N=112     
Source:  Regens and Gaddie (1995, p. 63) 
  
 As is shown by the numbers in Table 4, corporate PACs tend to lean towards 
Republicans with their contributions.  Conservatives are also benefactors of their 
giving, be they Democrats or Republicans.  Corporate PACs also favor the more 
vulnerable candidates.  A candidate for the U.S. Senate facing an incumbent governor 
will receive $180,000 more than a senator vying against a no-name candidate.  Still, 
despite all these factors that point to discretionary spending, corporate PACs most favor 
those senators, regardless or party or ideology, on the Commerce committee.  
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 Table 4:  Corporate PAC Contributions in 1990 dollars 
  Variable Unstandardized Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 44678.87  
Challenger quality 26324.70 3.06 
Democrat -164234.99 -3.29 
Freshman -11118.55 -.20 
Ideology 3789.27 3.99 
Marginality -1852.23 -.93 
Seniority -1110.45 -.27 
State population 17.35 4.88 
Temporal counter 87957.76 5.30 
Committee Assignments   
Agriculture -4017.26 -.08 
Banking -15690.48 -.33 
Commerce 92437.20 2.00 
Energy -48520.39 -1.08 
Labor -61917.59 -1.28 
Small business -45193.75 -1.01 
Adjusted R-squared=.59   
N=112   
Source:  Regens and Gaddie (1995, p. 65) 
 
 
 Labor PACs, on the other hand, give purely based on ideologies (See Table 5).  
Though those members on the Labor committee did receive a fair share of the monies, 
members on the banking and energy committees received larger portions, but overall, 
financial support from labor PACs went to Democratic senators – and, more 
specifically, ideologically liberal senators.  Challenger quality was also a factor in labor 
PAC giving.  Those senators who faced more experienced challengers were recipients 
of slightly more funding than those who ran against no-name competitors.   
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 Table 5:  Labor PAC Contributions in 1990 dollars 
  Variable Unstandardized Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 97072.31  
Challenger quality 5865.27 1.70 
Democrat 119257.70 5.95 
Freshman 4474.35 .20 
Ideology -1859.01 -4.87 
Marginality 1332.70 1.68 
Seniority 760.80 .46 
State population .12 .08 
Temporal counter 8881.59 1.34 
Committee Assignments   
Agriculture -287.21 -.01 
Banking 22348.72 1.18 
Commerce -7163.59 -.38 
Energy 24911.81 1.37 
Labor 7696.82 .39 
Small business 10693.46 .59 
Adjusted R-squared=.62   
N=112   
Source:  Regens and Gaddie (1995, p 66) 
  
  As could be expected, and as shown in Table 6, since trade PACs have similar 
initiatives as commerce PACs, giving tendencies by these trade interests closely 
resemble those of commerce PACs.  Conservative senators received a great deal more 
financial support than liberals, but party identity had no real impact on donations.  
Challenger quality also had a fairly significant effect on PAC giving, but only about 
half as much as it did for corporate PACs.  Also, members of the commerce committee 
received more than members of other committees – mostly due to the committee’s tax-
writing responsibilities and its effects on trade. 
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 Table 6:  Trade PAC Contributions in 1990 dollars 
  Variable Unstandardized Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 110151.52  
Challenger quality 11537.39 2.90 
Democrat -22043.32 -.95 
Freshman -24274.30 -.96 
Ideology 987.66 2.25 
Marginality -245.62 -.27 
Seniority -2579.55 -1.37 
State population 2.18 1.33 
Temporal counter 39386.26 5.13 
Committee Assignments   
Agriculture 32437.96 1.44 
Banking 7733.57 .35 
Commerce 36195.47 1.70 
Energy -28524.24 -1.37 
Labor -4540.81 -.20 
Small business 5711.82 .27 
Adjusted R-squared=.39   
N=112   
Source:  Regens and Gaddie (1995, p. 68) 
 
 Lastly, cooperative PACs, the most specialized group of all, only have one 
statistic that stands out in Table 7:  members of the agriculture committee received over 
$20,000 more than other senators, regardless of age, challenger quality, ideology, or 
party identity.  Since cooperative PACs are focused only on the needs of farmers in the 
nation’s heartland, and since agricultural policy usually tends to not have a partisan 
sway to it, these interest groups have one set of senators in mind – such is reflected in 
the numbers. 
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 Table 7:  Cooperative PAC Contributions in 1990 dollars 
  Variable Unstandardized Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 15686.75  
Challenger quality 576.07 .81 
Democrat 244.46 .06 
Freshman -2768.09 -.61 
Ideology -59.81 -.77 
Marginality 14.72 .09 
Seniority -244.85 -.73 
State population .11 .40 
Temporal counter 701.10 .51 
Committee Assignments   
Agriculture 21964.86 5.53 
Banking -3170.91 -.82 
Commerce 2610.46 .69 
Energy -1733.45 -.47 
Labor -3193.66 -.80 
Small business 1080.69 .29 
Adjusted R-squared=.21   
N=112   
Source:  Regens and Gaddie (1995, p. 69) 
 
 With such specialized giving by PACs, senators are at an advantage in that they 
are able to use their committee assignments and ideology to squeeze as much money as 
possible out of contributors.  Similarly, incumbents with high quality challengers or 
those who are more vulnerable – the ones needing the money the most, appear as 
investments with high returns to PACs.  These candidates will use their party and 
committee assignments to their highest potential as long as it will get them some 
campaign support.  It’s a seemingly win-win situation.  Candidates receive the money 
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they need and PACs receive the policy action and legislative influence that they so 
desire.  The incumbents and senators who are best able to receive such funding and 
efficiently utilize it are the ones who are able to maximize their discretionary and policy 
influence.   
 
 C.  Voting as a Result of Campaign Spending 
 
 Most anyone will agree that campaign expenditures and the number of votes a 
candidate receives have a positive relationship.  What is often questioned, though, is 
what shape a graph of this relationship might take:  is it a straight line?  Up and down? 
Or curvilinear?  A 1989 study by Kevin Grier shows that the number of votes 
candidates receive is a function of their own campaign expenditures, the expenditures of 
their opponent, and their ideological stances on the issues.  With multiple variables, we 
can assume that the relationship will be curvilinear, and perhaps with marginal returns.  
Dennis Mueller, in his Public Choice III, gives us an example of Coca-Cola advertising 
as an analogy:  Coke spends a large amount of money on advertising so the Coca-Cola 
name and logo stick in people’s minds.  With the first few advertisements, people take 
notice, and give Coke a good return for their spending.  However, the more and more 
ads that pop up in the market, the more saturated the market becomes, and the less 
likely people are to notice Coke’s ads.  This also holds true in political advertisements:  
the more saturated the market is with campaign literature and commercials, the less 
likely people are to pay attention to any particular one.  Mueller gives us Figure 1 to 
show the relationship: 
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 Figure 1:  Relationship between votes and campaign spending 
Votes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          CI                                                  Cz                       Campaign Spending 
   Source:  Mueller (2003, p. 483)                                                                
 This graph tells two important things about candidate behavior:  first, that there 
is an incentive to spend all funds raised since the curve does not ever turn downward, 
and, secondly, that the candidate has an incentive to raise enough funds to reach at least 
Cz so that the marginal returns in terms of votes is zero.  Figure 1 also shows us the 
advantages that an incumbent, or a more well-known candidate has.  Similar to 
advertising by large companies such as Coca-Cola, incumbents are able to start at a 
point around CI and thus have to spend less to receive a fair amount of votes (Mueller, 
481-483). 
 Grier’s 1989 study is based on a regression analysis that estimates the 
incumbent’s vote share based on the following equation: 
Vt = 48.3 + 4.37D +.19Vt-1 – 11.42S - .076CH + .000059CH
2 
+ .0287INC           
- .000016INC
2
            with R
2 
= 0.55, 
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where D is a dummy variable for the two years of the study: 1982 and 1984; S is a 
dummy variable that denotes a 1 for an incumbent caught in a scandal; CH and INC are 
the expenditures by the challenger and the incumbent respectively; and CH
2
 and INC
2
 
represent the diminishing returns of challenger and incumbent spending respectively.  
Grier’s regression produces the following findings: 
Table 8:  Proportion of marginal effects of spending on incumbents’ votes shares 
in 1984 
 Significantly < 0 Insignificangly different from 0 Significantly > 0 
Incumbents 0.14 0.86 0.00 
Challengers 0.01 0.08 0.91 
Source:  Mueller (2003, p. 484) 
 
Table 8 shows us that while 91 percent of challengers benefited from spending more 
money, none of the incumbents did, and at the same time, 14 percent of incumbents see 
small negative marginal impacts.  While this study does illustrate some important 
relationships between spending and voting, critics condemn it because of its lack 
leeway or correction for differences in ideologies and constituencies (Mueller 484).   
 
D. Social Welfare and Campaign Expenditures 
 
 In the 1999-2000 election cycle, total spending on congressional campaign 
exceeded $1 billion, up more than 25 percent since the 1997-1998 election cycle.  If you 
add the over $500 billion spent on the 2000 presidential primaries, then total political 
campaign spending amounts to more than $1.5 billion.  Additionally, if the Curtiss-
Wright foundation is correct in their estimation of $5 billion spent each year on 
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lobbying efforts to influence election and voting probabilities, then the total amount of 
political expenditures is over $10 billion.  While this is a significant amount of money 
spent, does the money make our government better?  Does it give us better political 
outcomes?  Does it improve the overall welfare of the constituents?  This all depends on 
one’s definition of better, of course, and since this is a rather biased interpretation, 
Mueller gives us an empirical definition: 
 W = a1U1 + a2U2 +...+ aiUi + … + anUn, 
where W is total social welfare, a is the positive weight placed on the utility of voter i, 
and U is the individual’s utility associated with campaign spending.  Assuming that W 
ends up as a positive number, we can assume that the political monies spent are indeed 
bettering the nation.   
 While numbers, charts, regressions and equations can tell us a lot about the inner 
workings of campaign finance and some of the math of campaign finance reform, they 
don’t tell us much about where we are going with reform proposals.  They can guide us 
in a new direction for policy, but can’t tell us whether or how we should limit funding.  
These numbers give us empirical evidence of the problems or lack thereof with 
campaign finance and help us to formulate our own opinions of the situation at hand, 
but such numbers are limited only to the past and present.  For reform to truly be 
effective it must look to the future, and in the future new approaches and methods of 
curtailing excessive campaign expenditures must be evaluated and implemented 
(Mueller 497-498).  
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III.  Ideas for Future Reform 
 
 Perhaps one of the most debated issues that is most often brought to public 
attention is that of campaign finance reform.  Republicans don’t want to change the 
current system simply because they historically have been better at raising money than 
the Democrats; and the Democrats want huge reform but until recently didn’t have the 
power to do much about it.  Such a standstill in the legislative system allows much time 
for formulation of various proposals.  While the main goal of campaign finance reform 
is a noble one to make all candidates and voters equal, there are two main reasons that a 
complete equality cannot be reached:  first because limits on raising or spending 
political monies that go beyond small government intervitions is an inhibition on one’s 
freedom of speech and disregards the First Amendment, and secondly because the 
discriminations in campaign finance not only represents an inequity among candidates 
but stems from inequities and classes in society as a whole – something that cannot be 
fixed or subdued with legislation.  Basically, complete campaign finance reform puts 
parties at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, and the idea of such reform is a 
noble but impractical and unachievable idea.  However, this doesn’t stop the thinkers of 
today from coming up with their own suggestions of how the system should be 
reformed.  Hopefully the following sketch of a few simple ones will paint enough of the 
bigger picture to make it clear. 
 One of the most popular reform ideas is to restrict active campaigning to a short 
period immediately before Election Day.  Typically the time period lawmakers want to 
allow is two to three months.  In America, a driving force behind excessive campaign 
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financing is the fact that politicians nowadays must plot their next fundraising step 
almost before they are ever even sworn into office.  Many European countries with 
parliamentary systems conduct campaigns that last at most four weeks and in some 
cases as little as twenty-one days.  By reducing the campaign period, one reduces the 
need for excessive fundraising to fuel a multi-year campaign, but at the same time such 
a restriction can hurt a challenger because he has very little time to gain name 
recognition as incumbency supplies huge competitive advantages. 
 Another proposal for reform, and possibly an answer to the challenger’s name 
recognition problem stated above, is that of “free” media coverage and advertising 
during the limited campaign period.  If networks and radio stations are forced by 
government to provide air time to candidates without charge, then the candidates not 
only benefit fiscally, but the American people benefit from less campaign rhetoric that 
can take place over years leading up to Election Day.  Yes, the major media companies 
would lose large chunks of revenue, but they are indebted to the government for the 
right to broadcast and the right to their license so I’m sure some sort of deal could be 
arranged. 
 A shady area of campaign finance is its connection with legislation.  Lobbyists 
comprise a large percentage of donors to political campaigns, and while giving money 
directly into the hands of lawmakers would be highly illegal, the donation of the same 
funds to their campaign is not.  Essentially the lawmakers are selling their votes on 
policy for contributions to their campaign.  Currently, twenty-two states prohibit such 
contributions from lobbyists and Kentucky and South Carolina prohibit any 
contributions whatsoever from lobbyists.  If donations by lobbyists were to be regulated 
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and perhaps prohibited, it not only would help to equal out the playing field as some 
lawmakers’ votes are worth much more than others, but it would also relieve the 
lobbyists as their jobs would no longer be based on supporting a campaign.  Yes free 
speech by the lobbyists is equally as important as free speech by other citizens, and yes 
they have a right to petition government, but when the dollars of these lobbyists are able 
to gain more influence than those dollars of others, one should be concerned and pull 
for regulation of their contributions. 
 A problem nearly as big as donations from lobbyists is that of attack ads.  
Advertising is the largest cost in a campaign despite the discounts given to campaigns, 
and recently most of those costs have been spent on advertisements that portray the bad 
characteristics of the challenger instead of the platform and history of the candidate.  
Perhaps if the media outlets were to give small segments of time at no charge in the 
days leading up to an election, the campaigns would be less inclined to budget so much 
money for advertising and their television time could be used more for discourse and 
debate than for attacks.   
 During the Clinton administration a popular form of this idea came from a group 
called the Gore Commission on campaign finance reform.  It suggested that in each of 
the thirty days prior to an election, the major television networks show five minutes of 
candidate discourse.  This plan was called the 5/30 plan and would require networks to 
take time from their regularly scheduled programming and devote it to debates, 
interviews, or even monologue by the candidates.  While five minutes may not seem 
like much time, it is more time than the average channel is now devoting to major 
campaigns.  In 1998 the Annenberg School for Communications at the University of 
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Southern California found that only forty-one seconds each day was devoted to the 
California gubernatorial race.  One can imagine that out of the forty-one seconds only a 
small portion was allotted to candidate discussion and that most was taken up by mud 
slinging and hate ads.  With free face time for candidates, not only are the issues more 
likely to emerge but also less money will need to be raised.  With the need for less 
money there is less opportunity for fundraising fraud and inequities, and while negative 
advertising has been found to be successful, success is not always sufficient for fairness 
or equality. 
 While Republicans are never the biggest proponents of campaign finance 
reform, their end-all-do-all for its problems is disclosure.  They call for prompter and 
more complete disclosure of political contributions, and in this day and age that means 
electronic reporting within twenty-four hours of the donation.  When George W. Bush 
was running for Governor of Texas, not only did he open campaign contributions to his 
website, he also put a mechanism for disclosure on his site as well.  He set the bar for 
following campaigns and lightened his campaign team’s load by making disclosure 
automatic.  Disclosure shouldn’t stop there.  While automation makes things easier, the 
Brennan Center suggests that for even more ease, disclosure should be divided into 
various categories instead of overwhelming the FEC with one lump-sums report of all 
donations together.  Perhaps disclosure databases could be split into who contributes, 
i.e., lobbyists in one pile and PACs in another.  
 Disclosure is most definitely a necessity for campaign finance, but without a 
mixture of disclosure and contribution limits, voters would likely become cynical of 
elections as they would form opinions that candidates had been bought, or too 
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financially influenced, to truly represent their ideology.  As with most policy, the best 
cure is a mixture of various ideas and not merely one theory comprising one hundred 
percent of the law.  
 Finally the most successful reform comes from the people, and the people 
ultimately choose their government regardless of how much money is spent.  If more 
money is spent on voter registration and getting voters to the polls, American’s can 
level out the political playing field by making it truly about the issues that matter to the 
people and not how much money is spent by the candidates.  If voting becomes easier 
for citizens, then candidates need not target their funds on the group that will vote.  It’s 
crazy to believe that there will ever be 100 percent voter turnout, but that should be our 
goal.  The presidential election in 2008 marked the highest voter turnout in years yet 
only 56 percent of the voting age population participated.  If our system is to be truly 
democratic and if the inequities are truly to be leveled, we must have a higher turnout – 
at this point funding discrepancies won’t matter as much (Birnbaum, 251-269).   
 Bill Bradley, in his 1996 address for campaign finance reform at the National 
Press Club, said that if only fifty percent of the people vote, and fifty percent of those 
people elect a President, then that President has been elected by only twenty-five 
percent of the people.  Therefore it is no wonder that people feel their representatives 
don’t really represent them – because they only reflect the votes of about a fourth of the 
people.  In this Bradley said that voter turnout reform was one of the most essential and 
primary steps to campaign finance reform, and he made four main suggestions to 
achieve that goal: 
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 1.  Allow people to register to vote all the way up to Election Day.  This is 
doable with modern technology, and if the computer finds voter fraud – a serious 
concern in the recent elections (for example, of all the counties in Mississippi, over half 
have more registered voters than their total population over 18) – it will also 
automatically void the votes.  Bradley asks why we should deny someone the right to 
vote only because they didn’t become interested in the election until November.   
 2.  Allow anyone to vote by mail regardless of their absentee status.  Sometimes 
voting crosses people’s minds a week before Election Day and not before.  Why 
prohibit their votes from being cast because of a mental lapse?  A vote is a vote and 
while it does make the counting process longer, it can even out many of the inequities 
of voting. 
 3.  Allow workers time off on Election Day.  If someone has to choose between 
eating lunch or voting, I can only imagine a small percentage would choose to go to the 
polls.  Many Americans’ jobs require them to work straight through the open hours for 
polls, and they don’t want to give up their lunch break to stand in line and check a few 
boxes.  While most states keep their polls open from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m., who’s to say that 
a normal day for some voters exceeds that time limit?  Some employees work shifts that 
last well through the night.  If a law were passed that mandated two or more hours off 
for each worker on Election Day, more voices would be heard. 
 4.  Allow people to vote via the Internet.  Many states already have 
institutionalized electronic voting machines at the polls, so why not turn people’s home 
computers into voting machines as well?  Of course, all of the security and fraud and 
privacy issues must be reconciled first, but if banking can be safely conducted online 
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then voting should be able to as well.  Our voting system and voter registration 
procedures are one of the most out-dated systems in the country.  If voter participation 
is at the forefront of every campaign, why wouldn’t we want to harness every 
technological advance we can to actually make a difference? 
 While the previous four suggestions may have seemed more like suggestions on 
election reform instead of campaign finance reform, understand that at the heart of 
every campaign contribution is a voter and every dollar of campaign finance is spent in 
attempts to influence that voter.  If voting is made more available to the people and 
more people want to vote, then less money will need to be spent – and in essence 
contributed – and there will be no need for fraudulent donations or soft money.  
Campaign contributions and votes are directly correlated, and due to barriers put in 
place by media outlets and the FEC, typically the more money raised means the more 
votes received.  The only true way to break down these inequities and make voting a 
truly democratic activity, is that a candidate must be able to achieve the same acclaim 
with any amount of money, and contributions from people like lobbyists must not be 
able to buy his or her votes.  This is where reforming the voting process and reforming 
campaign finance walk hand in hand.  
 Of course not all ideas for future campaign finance reform deal with 
restructuring elections or campaign advertising.  Many politicians and reformers alike 
note three main approaches to reforming campaign finance: the do little approach, the 
moderate approach, and the comprehensive approach.  In order to evaluate these three 
approaches, we look at five main criteria:  tensions between economic inequality and 
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political equality, electoral competition, voter turnout, voter information, and 
democratic accountability.   
  1.  The Do Little Approach 
 The do little approach is the favorite of most Republicans as they envision 
comprehensive campaign finance reform as putting shackles on people simply for the 
sake of equality.  They seem to like the comprehensive approach about as much as they 
like affirmative action, and thus choose an approach that takes more of a stand-off 
effect in all areas except for contribution disclosure – in this they want as much 
information available and required by law as possible.   
 As for the criteria under the do little approach:  there will be no effect on 
tensions between economic inequality and political equality.  In fact, perceptions of 
corruption will continue to exist and will increase if contribution limits are lifted.  
Electoral competition will be unaffected.  When little is done, the same attention will be 
paid to the contributors with the money.  Voter turnout most likely will remain 
unaffected and potentially will decrease as the do little approach increases perceptions 
of corruption and thus turns people away from voting and politics in general.  Voter 
information will not be affected, but the perceptions of corruption could have the same 
effect on voter desire to obtain information as it did on voter turnout.  The main and 
only real component of the do little approach is greater contribution disclosure, so 
democratic accountability will improve with this approach.  With increased disclosure 
comes more accountability to the people, and the more contribution information that is 
disclosed, the more able voters are to formulate opinions on candidates. 
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  2.  The Moderate Approach 
 The moderate approach is what most people think of when they think of 
campaign finance reform and involves at least one of the following:  campaign spending 
limits, loophole closure, and better enforcement.  McCain-Feingold as was described 
earlier would fall under this moderate category and is perhaps the most well known but 
most constitutionally suspect reform on the books.   Since we have a tangible example 
of the moderate approach, we can use McCain-Feingold as our means of evaluating the 
reform criteria.  The law’s limits on contributions and ban on soft money heeds a 
modest effect on tensions between political equality and economic inequality.  Electoral 
competition is increased with the TV and radio time that is given to limit-abiding 
candidates.  With the increase in face time on TV for these candidates, voter turnout is 
likely to increase as people have more information freely available to them.  Similarly, 
voter information is more prevalent, especially for challengers or lesser-known 
candidates.  Finally, with the elimination of soft money, campaigns are more 
democratically accountable to the people as undisclosed monies would be limited.   
  3.  The Comprehensive Approach 
 As the name implies, this method is the most complete and most restrictive form 
of campaign finance reform.  While much of it is seemingly unobtainable, this is the 
favored method by Democrats and those politicians that lean more to the left.  Ideally 
with this approach, campaigns would be publicly financed by taxpayers’ dollars, there 
would still be bans on soft money, and limits like those in McCain-Feingold on issue 
ads would remain in place.   
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 The comprehensive approach proves to have a much greater and more dramatic, 
be it good or bad, effect on our criteria.  By publicly funding campaigns, private monies 
are completely removed, which reduces the perception that government is controlled by 
the interests with the biggest budgets.  This in turn reduces tensions between economic 
inequality and political equality.  Electoral competition is heightened as all candidates, 
even challengers, are receiving more money – in more equal amounts – since campaigns 
are publicly funded.  This gives the incumbent more of a challenge to stick to his guns 
since his fundraising advantage has been diminished.  Voter turnout will increase as 
campaign monies can be focused on voter mobilization instead of advertising.  Also, 
with increased electoral competition comes greater interest in the election, thus 
increased voter turnout tends to follow.  Similarly voter information will be increased as 
challenger and incumbent funds become more equal, name recognition for all 
candidates is more prevalent and voters have access to more information than mere hate 
ads.  Lastly, comprehensive reform also includes the same disclosure properties as the 
do little approach, so democratic accountability would increase as more information is 
available and as campaigns are required to disclose everything in a timely manner              
(Goidel 157-172). 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
 While campaign finance reform began with the realization of a problem, perhaps 
more of a problem has been the realization of campaign finance reform.  From 
Roosevelt’s vague ideas on contribution regulations, to the very verbose yet not 
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altogether revolutionary ideas in McCain-Feingold, campaign finance regulation and 
reform has had a long and turbulent history.  Not unlike other policy issues, 
Republicans want less government intervention and Democrats want more.  
Republicans are open to greater disclosure of information with fewer restraints while 
Democrats would prefer less disclosure and more, if not complete, restraint on 
campaign contributions.   
 Tammany Hall made us believe that campaigns should be publicly funded, and 
Teapot Dome taught us that propaganda wasn’t the only thing being bought with 
campaign funds.  If our battles with reform legislation have done nothing else, they 
have taught us much, or so one could only hope.  FCPA led to FECA, and FECA led to 
BCRA; and where BCRA will lead us, we may never know.  With each new acronym 
comes new ways of evading the rules – as Justices Stevens and O’Connor noted in their 
hydraulic theory of Buckley v. Valeo.  What was once an authority on political 
contributions, the Hatch Act now serves mostly as a reminder that federal employees 
cannot participate legally in political activity.   
 Scandals like Watergate were (supposedly) halted by FECA, and excessive soft 
money use as exemplified by Clinton’s 1996 campaign was (purportedly) cut off by 
BCRA.  Yet over and over again the Court has ruled that one cannot put a cap on 
spending by campaigns as it limits their First Amendment rights, but one can tell donors 
when they must stop giving, as an infringement of their rights is much less important 
than the potential corruption flowing from too much funding.  For the Court, money has 
been deemed property and not speech, so limiting the giving of property has no 
connection to anything in the First Amendment – though this definition of property has 
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been applied only to money that is given to campaigns and not money that is spent by 
campaigns.   
 We have noted that all candidates are rent-seekers, and that all candidates’ main 
goal is that of election to office.  Clearly, rent-seeking behavior and election-seeking 
behavior go hand in hand.  Those candidates that are able to raise the most money have 
the best chances at election and admittedly or not, that is the main issue that 
policymakers aim to correct with campaign finance legislation.  It seems that their 
rationale turns the American Dream from great opportunity for success to great 
opportunity for equality.  While publicly funded campaigns may level out the playing 
field, does the playing field really need to be leveled?  Of course there must be 
restrictions on how money is given, but if one candidate has an absolute advantage in 
fundraising skills, why make him put a muzzle on them? 
 The market for campaign contributions and political favors is exactly that:  a 
market.  It is at equilibrium when the elected candidates are able to supply exactly the 
policies that are demanded by their donors.  Yes, there will be periods in which the 
dominant party will hinder this equilibrium from being met, but don’t all markets return 
to equilibrium eventually without any outside action?  In a macroeconomic model, 
when the government interferes with expansionary or contractionary fiscal or monetary 
policy, output either rises of falls outside of potential, but will eventually return to 
normal – except that prices have been affected.  Without government intervention both 
prices and output would return to their original position.   
 We have seen that various groups favor various candidates mostly for 
ideological purposes, and other for influential purposes.  This isn’t unfair by any means.  
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In order for categorized contributions to be effective, not only does the ideology of the 
donor group have to match that of the candidate, but the ideology of the candidate has 
to match up with the voters.  In essence the ideology of the donor group must also 
match that of the voters.  So while the voters may see such donations as buying votes, 
the candidate wouldn’t have been in office if such votes didn’t also match a majority of 
their ideological stance. 
 As for future reform, it would seem from an economic standpoint, that the do 
little approach is best.  Not only does it limit the need for excessive government 
interference, it also allows the markets of campaign finance to return to equilibrium 
naturally.  Yes there will be fluctuations, but (at least until this administration) we 
haven’t called on government action when the stock market has had its ups and downs.  
If the government needs to fund something publicly, why not publicly fund voter 
registration drives, get out the vote efforts, or television time for candidate debates and 
discourse?  While the FEC should still exist as a monitoring and disclosure effort, it 
should focus its efforts on actually doing its job instead of attempting to level out the 
playing field.  Perhaps it may be best described as such:  too much interference by the 
government leads to too little interest by the people.  If donors fear that the next dollar 
could land them in jail or paying some fine, the entertaining boxing ring of politics will 
cease to exist outside the Beltway - though maybe that is the reformers’ end goal.  As 
long as comprehensive campaign finance reform remains something only to be debated 
and something to add to Congress’s agenda and debate schedule then who’s to stop 
them.  But when it starts to creep in as socialist campaign law, get us out.   
 I’m Meghan Milloy and I approve this message.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Summary of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act__________________________ 
Political Party Soft Money 
National Party Committees 
National party soft money is prohibited.  The national parties and their affiliates 
may raise and spend only money subject to federal contribution limits and 
source restrictions, no matter how the money is spend 
 
State and Local Parties 
State, district, and local party committees funding “federal election activities” 
must do so with money subject to federal contribution limits.  Federal election 
activities are defined to include: 
 Voter registration activity within 120 days of the election 
 Voter identification, get out the vote (GOTV), activity, or generic 
campaign activity conducted in connection with federal election 
 Communications naming a federal candidate that promote or attach the 
candidate 
“Federal election activity” does not include:  communications naming state 
candidates with no federal candidates; contributions to state candidates; 
state/local political conventions; state candidate grassroots materials; state/local 
party office construction/purchase costs. 
 
Leavin Amendment Exception-Voter registration and GOTV may be funded with 
soft money, limited to $10,000 per source, if such contributions are allowed 
under state law.  Contributors may include corporations and labor unions, if state 
law permits.  Money raised under this exception must meet the following 
conditions: 
 Federal officeholders, candidates, national parties, and their agents may 
not raise “Levin Amendment” funds. 
 The funds cannot be used for federal-candidate-specific or generic 
advertising. 
 All receipts and disbursements must be disclosed. 
 Party committees are prohibited form jointly raising these funds. 
 A state party committee cannot raise the money for use in other states. 
 The funds cannot be transferred between party committees. 
 The soft money must be matched by hard money under Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) allocation rules. 
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Nonparty Electioneering 
 
Definition/Coverage 
An “electioneering communication” is a broadcast, cable, or satellite 
communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate within 60 days of a 
general election or 30 days of a primary, and that is “targeted.”  A 
communication is targeted if it can be received by 50,000 or more persons in the 
district or state where the election is being held.  Subsequent FEC regulation 
said this provision was limited to paid advertising.   
 
Corporate/Union “Electioneering” Prohibited 
Corporations and unions are prohibited from directly or indirectly making or 
financing electioneering communications, although they may still form a 
registered political action committee (PAC) funded with voluntary, limited, 
individual contributions (hard money), for election communication.  The 
corporate restriction extends to nonprofit corporations and to incorporated 
political committees (other than PAC’s, parties, and candidates) as defined by 
section 527 of the tax code.  Subsequent FEC regulation exempted nonprofit 
charities, which are prohibited from political activity under tax law. 
 
Electioneering Disclosure 
Entities making electioneering communications must file a disclosure report 
within 24 hours, once an aggregate of $10,000 is spent, and thereafter each time 
an additional $10,000 is spent.  Disclosure includes the identity of the spender, 
all persons sharing control over the communication, and all donors giving 
$1,000 or more. 
 
Federal Office Holders, Candidates, Party Officials, and Agents 
 
Federal Election Activity 
Federal officeholders, candidates, national parties, and their agents (as well as 
entities directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by, 
or acting on behalf of, federal candidates or officials) may not solicit, receive, 
direct, transfer, or spend any soft money in connection with a federal election, 
with a limited exception for nonprofit corporations described below.  This 
includes “Levin Amendment” funds for registration and GOTV. 
 
State or Local Election Activity 
Any solicitation by federal officials or candidates in connection with a state or 
local election must be limited to money consistent with federal contribution and 
source limitations. 
 
Appearances at State Party Events 
Federal officials, candidates, etc., may appear at, and be a featured guest of 
speaker at, a state party event at which the party raises soft money for its 
purposes.  Although the law says the candidate may not solicit money at these 
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events, the FEC said in its subsequent regulations that it would not police formal 
speeches or informal conversations at such events.  Nothing in the law prohibits 
state party officials from soliciting money at an event at which a federal official 
speaks. 
 
Fund-Raising for Nonprofits 
Federal officials and candidates may solicit funds without limit for the general 
treasury of any tax-exempt organization described in section 501 of the tax code, 
as long as the principal purpose of the organization is not to conduct certain 
specified federal election activities.  Amounts and sources are limited if the 
contributions are earmarked for registration or GOTV, but not if they are 
contributions for general funds and the organization uses some of its general 
funds for political activity.  National Parties may not contribute to or solicit 
money for nonprofit corporations or political committees as defined by section 
527 of the tax code. 
 
Contribution Limits 
 
Individuals 
 To a candidate:  Increased from $1,000 per election to $2,000 and 
indexed for inflation. 
 To a single national party committee:  increased from $20,000 per year 
to $25,000 within the aggregate limits below. 
 To a state of local party committee:  Changed from $5,000 for a state 
party’s federal account to $10,000 for each state, local, or district 
committee that engages in federal activities, within the aggregate limits 
below. 
 To a PAC:  Did not change from $5,000.  Also no change in the limit of 
$5,000 per election for a contribution by a PAC to a candidate.  PAC 
limits are not indexed. 
 Aggregate Limit:  Increases the maximum an individual can give, in 
combined contributions, from $25,000 per year with no sublimits, to 
$97,500 for two years, with the following sublimits: 
o $37,500 to candidates 
o $57,500 to all PAC and party committees combined 
 No more than $37,500 to all PAC’s combined 
 The remainder to party committees. 
 Indexing:  Limits on individual contributions to candidates and parties 
and individual aggregate limits are indexed for inflation, as are the limits 
on coordinated party support for a candidate. 
 Millionaire Opponent Provision:  Increases contribution limits for 
congressional candidates facing self-financed candidates.  These go up 
on a sliding scale, depending on the amount of self-financing, with 
qualifying thresholds and maximum contributions differing for the 
House and Senate.  At its highest, the maximum contribution to Senate 
candidates may be increased sixfold, and the limits on party support for 
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the candidate are removed.  Increased contributions triggered by this 
provision do not count against a donor’s aggregate limits. 
o Self-financed candidates are also prohibited, after any given 
Election Day, from repaying outstanding loans the candidates 
make to their own campaigns in excess of $250,000. 
 
Coordination 
Coordinated spending as a contribution:  Any expenditure made by a person 
other than a candidate or party will count as a contribution if it is coordinated 
with the candidate or party.  Coordination is defined as a payment made in 
cooperation with, at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, candidate’s agent, 
or campaign or party.  This reiterates previous statute law.  Congress also told 
the FEC to discard its current regulations and write new ones that do not require 
agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination.  The FEC’s 
subsequent regulations covered all election-related communications 
disseminated within 120 days of an election if the person making the 
communication meets any one of a series of conduct standards, including using 
a common vendor who makes use of material information learned from one 
client to prepare communications for the other. 
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